So, you’re back to work?

School summer holiday has come to an end in Australia and I get asked ‘And you? You’re back to work?’, naturally implying that as an academic I, too, have spent the past seven weeks off like my children and just returned to work now. For most people outside universities the work academics do is hard to imagine. Those who had been students at some point in their lives know that we teach and somehow  imagine that teaching requires some preparation. Although — I’m not even sure that they do, given that one of my student evaluations last year accused me of being ‘lazy’ because I ‘only’ delivered 16 hours of lectures and made the students present in the last five sessions…

At the same time there is a debate raging on twitter not about whether we DO work a lot but if that’s a good thing or a bad thing and whether we should brag about our 60 hours per week or mourn about our family/love/social lives going to sh**. And newspapers recycling the myth that research is a walk in the park or, actually, something easily done during a maternity-leave holiday when nursing a baby or in between changing nappies.

Just to be clear: I don’t work 60 hours…anymore. I did for a long time and my health and family suffered so I am extremely careful nowadays not to fall into that trap again. Two children and a partner — a family, in short — need attention, time and love, and THAT needs time! And yet, the price I pay for sticking to my 40 hours a very slow career because I publish far less than most of my colleagues. And I moved from the country that presently is the busiest in making academic life hell to sun shine Oz.

That said, what do we do spend our time with when we work 40 hours even in teaching-off times? Maybe I should give a little breakdown of my week to make it real:


At the computer at about 9.30 after having dropped off my seven-year old at her vacation care spot. It’s been six weeks now that my research assistant has sent me her annotated bibliography that I wanted to integrate in the literature review I’m writing at the moment so from 9.30 to lunchtime I verify her sources, look up others that I think should be associated with them and write on my review. I manage to write my set goal of 1000 words so call it a good day at lunch. After lunch I skim through my emails: I’m Director of Teaching and Learning and as the new semester starts in two weeks there are couple of changes to their teaching colleagues want me to approve. It takes approx. one hour to read through the notes and requests and even though I just need to write ‘happy to approve’-emails, it nags away time. Then I go back to my own teaching. I have not finalised the reading list yet as I want to have more than half of the required readings to be books or articles by female colleagues. Despite the massive increase of women in academia and in IR, they are less likely to be cited in scholarly articles and less likely (by far) to appear on syllabi. Especially in my area of teaching (International Security, International Cooperation) the ‘canon’ is still dominated by men. If you use only google scholar and textbooks to constitute your reading list you will miss out on the excellent work of women who know stuff.  Because of this male dominance, however, it is extremely time consuming to put women and minority scholars on the reading list. Luckily other colleagues have started to establish reading lists and yet these are far from complete. But…it still takes time, so two hours of my Monday afternoon were spent on putting together the reading list for lectures 1-3 — out of 12 so still a lot to do! In the meantime it is 4 in the afternoon and I have one hour left before I my partner will pick up our little one and work time is up! Time to think up a couple of quiz questions for the assessments…


In the office at 9.30 I have half an hour before student A.B. will come to discuss her study arrangements for next academic year. Student A.B. has failed several assignments last year and requires special attention to get her back on track. It’s the same for students C.D. and E.F. who will come later in the morning for the same reason. None of the students have the same circumstances and student E.F.’s case requires a follow-up with the Associate Dean for Learning and Teaching as I have frankly no idea how to handle this special case. Lunchtime comes and I have not yet written one line or looked at my reading lists…After lunch I skim through my emails and this there are a couple that need more extensive replies so the afternoon is taken up by emails and working on my reading lists. No writing. 🙁

Wednesday same as Tuesday. Thursday I have the desk clear to write on my review just to discover that most of what I wrote on Monday needs redrafting. But another 1000 words get done. Good day. In the evening, after dinner, I get back to my reading list as a colleague had posted a request for reading tips on Facebook and I want to see if the responses he gets fit my reading list, too. Another two hours to add to a usual work day.

Friday starts with emails and following up on the literature tips from Thursday night. Lunch with guests. And an early end to the working day as we can only afford after-school care for three days a week.

That’s about 40 hours, i.e. 2000 words of a paper draft, three dozen emails, pastoral care for five students, two dozen administrative requests, half a syllabus written, a couple of assignments thought up, two conference panels organised but — lucky week! — no meetings and no classroom teaching yet, no student emails, no lectures to prepare (commonly two hour lectures), no papers/lectures/recordings to upload on the class site, no news paper read and no assignments to mark; also no research to organise or do (e.g. interviews), no special readings other than those I’m writing about, no journal articles to review, no grad student papers to read, no journal/book to edit etc. If I would want to do what I did this week and any of these other things, or what I did this week but write 5000 instead of 2000 words (as I should if I want to publish more) or what I did and any fancy admin or ‘academic community’ position (let’s say journal editor) then yes, then I would have to work 60 hours and so I’m not doing it. Good for my health and sanity, bad for my career. But if you sleep well, even guilt is easier to bear.


China and the UN: Playing Go in international relations

The trouble with China is that it is not behaving the way either Realist or Liberal theories of international relations want it to behave. In terms of these traditional approaches to IR, China is becoming bigger and stronger and more powerful every day. China holds more than 14trillion US$ in foreign exchange reserve; it has a population of almost 1.4 billion; in absolute GDP it is the strongest economy in the world and its military is, if not the largest (that’s by far the US) big, modern and equipped with nuclear weapons. All this, so tell us realists like John Mearsheimer should push China to become extremely competitive and nasty as it grows stronger, eventually leading to a confrontation with the USA and to war. Yes, yes, that is what will happen, tells us Graham T. Allison, even if nobody wants it because becoming big and strong when there is a big and strong superpower in the world has always led to war in Europe in the past couple of hundred years.

Detail from the Jingban tianwen quantu, showing a world map derived from the Sancai tuhui (Illustrated compilation of the Three Powers; 1607). Source: The Library of Congress Map Room (online collection); taken from

Now, looking into European history for knowing what will happen with China is  an excellent way to show that Eurocentrism leads to weird ways of thinking about international politics. China has a thousand-year old history of diplomacy, war and peace of its own. Its geopolitical as well as economic position in the world is rather different than that of Spain in the 16th, France’s in the 17th, Russia’s in the 18th, Great-Britain’s in the 19th century or Germany’s in the 20th century. Its history of national unity and nationalism, its internal political structures and the way it has rather slipped than marched into the international scene over the past thirty years… these are only few of the factors that should make you think twice about using European or North-American analogies if you are seriously interested in understanding where this country is heading .

Very obviously the way the international system has been built upon diplomacy and international law, and how the discipline of international relations has come to take the European war-state paradigm as universal feature of the international do not seem to fit the bill with China. Yes, China does behave like a high school bully in the South China Sea, it does not hide its military and wants everyone , and particularly Taiwan, to see how many shiny new toys it has; yes, the Chinese government and media often display high levels of aggressive nationalistic rhetoric; and yes, they also follow rather closely the script of 20th century discourses on sovereignty, non-interference and inviolability of borders. In short, China does tend to be ‘assertive’ when it comes to its territorial integrity (notably with respect to Taiwan) and its undoubtedly traditionally defined sovereignty. These are the moments where China’s behaviour seems the most congruent to IR textbooks on international diplomacy. But as good student of international relations, China also plays the game extremely nicely to the rules and has yet not shown even the slightest signs of the hubris and destructiveness other ‘rising powers’ have displayed. If it is supposed to emulate Germany in the early 20th century, then China clearly does not play this role very well.

Indeed, China  has shied away from direct military confrontations after its ill-fated incursion into Vietnam in 1979. It has shown a pragmatically cooperative approach in the international organisations it has joined since 1949. It is seeking to build up cooperative ties with its neighbours. It has used its huge economic power wisely and cooperatively in the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing global economic crisis. And it has engaged more and more in multi-lateral international aid and United Nations security politics. And it has now declared loudly and strongly its intention to support UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s remodelling of the UN.

China is ready to work together with other countries to forge a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation, to build a community with a shared future for mankind, and to build an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity,” they write in in their recent position paper on UN reforms. These are not very original words and the further pages of the Chinese position paper carefully follow this common-talk, vague-and-nice line of UN talk.

Yet, given the current state of American UN ‘diplomacy’, China’s position paper comes as a clear eyes-on-the-prize announcement that China would be happy to take over the US role as motor of international multilateralism should the US leave that post vacant. This move is not formulated as an open challenge and the strategy rather seems to be to discretely slip into the gap that has opened between the Trump’s USA and the rest of the world. The position paper cleverly focuses on all areas the Trump ‘administration’ has decided to shun in the past year: development assistance and here particularly women’s rights and gender parity, peacekeeping and conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, and internal management, budget and human resources reforms.

It formulates clearly three fundamentals of China’s foreign policy: the insistence sovereignty in its full territorial sense (inviolability of borders) and of states as sole subjects of international law (reflecting precisely its ‘one country, two systems’ politics towards Taiwan); and a focus on pragmatic, technocratic and managerial, hence, ‘apolitical’, approaches to challenges of international cooperation. So far, its approach corresponds to the classical liberal-institutionalist view of international politics where states understand quickly that the relative gains of cooperation are more important than the absolute gains of domination.

However, China also slips in a third principle that quite fundamentally disturbs the basic tenets of liberal institutionalism, namely a carefully but persistently formulated refutation of globally applicable UN politics. Although the position paper repeats the universal value of the UN and its Charter, its overall tone tells a different story of de-centralization, regionalisation and differentiation of cooperation. Whether in terms of conflict resolution, peacekeeping and fighting terrorism, or in terms of economic and social development, the position paper proposes each time a ‘everyone-their-own’ approach. It proposes to leave the UN as central bureaucracy to coordinate and funnel human and financial resources. But the real decisions, those on what to prioritise, what to define as security risk or development need, what to do simply, these decisions should be left to nation-states and, as far as possible, regional arrangements or arrangements between those states that are primarily concerned by such measures. The UN organs and institutions should be remodelled to allow such decentralized, case-by-case and variable geometry decision-making. For instance, decisions on peacekeeping and conflict resolution should be removed as much as possible from the UN Security Council and taken by the UN peacebuilding commission under consultation of the host country/ies and the contributing countries. Development policies equally should be more deeply anchored in specialized agencies (for instance by reviving the Economic and Social Council) and consultation mechanisms of receiving and contributing states strengthened in these, or, even better, delegated to regional sub-divisions.

The Chinese position paper shows that China clearly wants to write its own story of international cooperation but not according to the frontal confrontation rules of 19th century European-style war-and-concert diplomacy. The Europeans invented the two-dimensional, linear chess game to mimic diplomacy and war; the Chinese invented Go which thinks strategy fluidly in multiple spaces. The UN position paper shows that China today orients its foreign policy on principles of Go rather than chess and that it is time for Eurocentric IR to learn something new.