In August 2026, Sara Merger (Uni Melbourne) published a report showing that misogyny is the clearest indicator for youth radicalisation, i.e. it shows better than other socio-economic indicators whether online material is likely to lead to radicalisation – independently of whether the radicalisation was reproducing right-wing ideology, extremist Islamism or left-wing ideologies. For feminists this does not come as a surprise as the similarities between right-wing, left-wing and religious extremism have long been analysed as patriarchal and recognised for what they were. Black feminists notably have not tired to denounce the sexism of Black social movements that compound the racial discrimination of Black women. Similarly, for many feminists of colour in post-colonial contexts, the intersectionality of racism and sexism has too often resulted in difficult or impossible choices over the question of whose liberation counts (first). Both communities of thinkers and activists have struggled, quarrelled and despaired over the fact that for the men in the resistance movements, civil rights or post-colonial national liberation meant the restoration of male dominance and toxic masculinity. Radical feminists, on the other hand, have regularly denounced the patriarchy supportive moves of liberal or ‘boss girl’ ‘feminism’.
What is common to all these radical movements, whether on the left or right or religious, is the production of a range of what Serene Khader has called ‘faux feminists’, i.e. women who will carry the banner of the extremist movement and support its radical masculinism. They will often do so in the disguise of ‘women’s emancipation’, whether posing as a businesswoman as Melania Trump did in her official White House portrait, or by excelling in achievements while advocating for profoundly patriarchal positions like Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett. In the recent wave of right-wing authoritarianism in the USA and other established democracies, a range of female figures have also stood out for their unwavering support of patriarchy and sexist politics, whether as matriarchs of racist, extreme right-wing parties like Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Marine Le Pen in France or Alice Weidel in Germany; or as supportive wives and groupies like Erika Kirk, or the running joke of Natalie Harp.
The good wife role of supporting patriarchal structures, which, in classical online meme form, is best encapsulated in the trend of tradwives, is structurally complementary to the hyperaggressive manosphere culture of the internet and extremists like the incel scene whose greatest grievance is not having ‘wives’.
Whether tradwife, the conservative role of the good wife/daughter/sister, or no wife – political extremism that is built on a culture of extreme social Darwinism and hierarchical competition reduces women to a material status symbol and a mere function of male domination. ‘Having’ wives or children is primarily an indicator of male fertility and social hierarchical status; for the men as much as for the women. Which is why, despite all displays of ’emancipation’ these women might seek to display or profess, they are, as Khader says, ‘faux’ – pretend, fake, cosplay.
Beyond these examples of celebrity fauxs, female support for patriarchal structures in behaviours of ‘good wife’ imagery exists on all levels of society. The sociologist Deniz Kandrioti has coined the term ‘patriarchal bargain’ for this arrangement where women will support patriarchal and systemically sexist social structures in exchange for social status, and eventually security, whether financial, physical, social or all together. Again, Melania Trump might be a good example of a woman who, as someone without many resources and living precariously in the US in the 1990s in financial as well as legal terms, has in purely transactional form traded her body and person in to achieve an income and financial, legal, and social security for herself, her child and her wider family. A trade that is not only entirely normalised in our patriarchal society but also institutionalised in various forms in politics and the economy with subservient and subordinated jobs being highly feminised. These are institutional structures where the most convincing argument for a woman in patriarchal circles to get a job, to be seen to do a job well or to run for office remains that she is the ‘wife/daughter/sister of’ or, in default of such direct credentials, that her work is dutifully, loyally and selflessly supporting the man, institution, community or, simply, others like a wife would support her husband/father/brother and wider family. The heavy advertisement of women who are primarily wives as stand-ins for male dominance, whether in the literal or figurative sense, is thus a key marker of extremism, as it is the mirror image of a toxic masculinist culture of male supremacist thought.
While Sara Merger’s excellent study shows that this is true for all forms of extremism, the current mid-term election campaign in the USA shows how this is also a shtick the other way round. Looking at it from a reverse point of view, it becomes possible to retrospectively see the failure of Erika Kirk to keep her husband’s movement Turning Point USA alive or the dissidence of a range of online tradwives as precursors of the blue wave that the USA is expecting next week. Or the fact that a large range of tradwife celebrities, too, jumped ship in 2026, and the novel Yesteryear by Caro Claire Burke, which deals with the toxicity of the tradwife trend, became a major literary event. At the same time, the Trumpist White House has become an ever more toxic place for women: it has become a daily occurrence that the President will insult female journalists in the most vulgar way; there are fewer than half of the women who started in Trump’s second administration still standing; and a wide range of prominent MAGA supporters like Marjorie Taylor Greene have broken ranks.
On the other hand, according to the Center for American Women and Politics, there have never been so many women running for office as in these mid-term elections, whereby Democrats have nominated more than twice as many women to run as Republicans have, while on the other hand a large number of Republican women have decided to not run again. Still according to CAWP, women make up 45.6% of Democratic incumbent nominees and 14.5% of Republican ones. Among non-incumbent nominees, women are 45.3% of Democrats and 20.1% of Republicans. Yet, even these lower numbers of Republican candidates are setting a new record for the GOP.
If the elections go as the polls suggest, there will be the highest number of women in Congress ever. And if past experiences with women in Congress continue, many issues that are currently partisan under masculinist pressures, like family/domestic violence, online sexual and children’s abuse, or the infamous Epstein files, might become bipartisan and subject to new legislation. Because just as misogyny transcends ideological differences in extremist political movements, gender and family issues, especially when concerned with violence against women and children, are matters that have in the past transcended the faux/true feminist differentiation.
This said, the most pressing issues in terms of a feminist-progressive agenda that embraces an economy of care – abortion, or rather, bodily autonomy of women identified people and climate change action – are definitely neatly divided along good wife/true feminist and partisan lines. In good wifely manner, Republican women will soften the harshness and violence of masculinist policies but just so much as to keep the system afloat to work better for them and their own; not to change it to work better for everyone.